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CAPTURING REGULATORY AGENDAS? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INDUSTRY USE OF RULEMAKING 
PETITIONS 
 
Daniel E. Walters1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A great deal of skepticism toward administrative agencies stems from the widespread perception that they 
excessively or even exclusively cater to business interests.  From the political right comes the accusation that 
business interests use regulation to erect barriers to entry that protect profits and stifle competition.  From the 
political left comes the claim that business interests use secretive interactions with agencies to erode and negate 
beneficial regulatory programs. Regulatory “capture” theory elevates many of these claims to the status of 
economic law. Despite growing skepticism about capture theory in academic circles, empirical studies of business 
influence and capture return ambiguous results, and they have failed to analyze fully the critical agenda-setting 
stage of the regulatory process (where business influence is likely to be especially pronounced), leaving capture 
theory standing as a plausible description of regulatory policymaking.   
 
In this Article, I take a close look at business influence in the agenda-setting stage of the rulemaking process. 
Using original data on all the rulemaking petitions submitted to three administrative agencies from 2000 to 
2016, I trace how, when, and why agencies respond, giving attention to the agencies’ responsiveness to the type 
of petitioner and the character of the requests.  Although business interests may participate at a higher rate than 
public interest groups and individuals, analysis of the factors that drive agency decision making about which 
petitions to accept suggests a distinct lack of any business advantage.  Even in a venue where it would be 
exceedingly easy to give business interests precisely what they want, agencies remain largely unmoved and even-
handed.  The pattern that does emerge—an agency preference for using petitions to inform incremental revision 
of existing regulations to reflect changed circumstances or new technologies—probably does inure mostly to the 
benefit of regulated entities, but it is difficult to square with theories of excessive influence or capture of the 
regulatory process by business interests. These findings strongly suggest that agencies are able to maintain critical 
distance from business in making important decisions about the scope of the regulatory agenda and, by extension, 
the content of regulatory law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Regulation Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  This paper stems from my doctoral dissertation 
work on rulemaking petitions.  I thank Cary Coglianese, Susan Yackee, Ryan Owens, Dave Weimer, and 
Donald Downs for their guidance on this project, Gabe Scheffler and Shana Starobin for their feedback, and 
Dori Molozonov and Melinda Wang for their helpful research assistance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Few questions have received as much attention as those surrounding business influence in 
the regulatory process.2  The relationship between business interests and regulatory policymaking is 
widely perceived as a close one—so much so that agencies are often thought to be fully “captured” 
(i.e., controlled) by the businesses they regulate.3 As the economist George Stigler put it in one 
influential contribution to one strand of “capture theory,”4 generally speaking, “regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”5 This story of 
business capture, in turn, is often cited as a reason for reformation of the administrative process,6 if 
                                                
2 William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds., 2014); 
PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981) (discussing the development of the 
capture idea); Chris Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, George Stigler, ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation,’ in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CLASSICS IN PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 287 (Steven J. Balla, Martin Lodge, & 
Edward C. Page, eds. 2015). 
3 See Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 4 (Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds., 2014) (noting 
that much of the literature on regulation relied on “models in which capture of regulators by incumbent firms 
is all but inevitable”); BRINK LINDSEY AND STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY (2017) (arguing 
that capture is widespread in federal, state, and local regulation, and that this capture is a major reason for 
growing economic inequality and stagnant economic growth).   
4 William Novak has brought attention to the numerous strands of “capture theory,” including variants 
emanating from political science scholarship, see Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The 
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955), from historical scholarship, see GABRIEL 
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 
(1963), and even in the work of Progressive era scholars, such as Frank Goodnow and Woodrow Wilson, 
who helped build the modern administrative state. See Novak, supra note 2.  One of the striking things about 
the many strands of capture theory is that they know no ideological boundaries.  See Carpenter & Moss, supra 
note 3, at 5 (linking capture theory to a “fatalism” about government regulation that can be “seen in the 
center, the left, and the right of political discourse”). 
5 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). In this canonical 
statement, Stigler clearly echoes Richard Olney’s remark, made half a century before during the creation of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, that “[t]he Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the 
railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that 
that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined 
it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. . . . The part of wisdom is not to destroy the 
Commission, but to utilize it.” Thomas Frank, Obama and “Regulatory Capture,” WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2009), 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124580461065744913. 
6 STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY 
GOVERNMENT 22 (2008) (“The public choice theory’s account of regulation carries with it a reform agenda: 
The view that the fundamental differences between regulatory and market decisionmaking explain the 
problem with regulation strongly suggests that market outcomes are preferable to regulatory outcomes.”); 
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not for the wholesale “deconstruction of the administrative state.”7 So goes the thinking, capture is 
so institutionally implanted that it is better to pull out the entire institution, root and branch, than 
to seek measured reforms.8 
 
However, empirical work examining these claims about business influence has returned 
mixed evidence and ambiguous takeaways.  On the one hand, virtually every study of business 
participation finds that business interests do in fact have an outsized voice (i.e., participate more 
consistently) in the regulatory process, particularly in the context of the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s “notice-and-comment” process.9 Some studies have likewise shown that business interests are 
more influential than other groups when they submit comments or meet with decisionmakers, 
particularly when they are unopposed.10  On the other hand, few studies have been able to show 
empirically that this outsized participation and influence actually translates into de facto control 
over agency decisions, as capture theory would seem to require.11  
                                                
Carpenter & Moss, supra note 3, at 10 (noting that “arguments stipulating capture often carry policy 
prescriptions. They move quickly from ‘is’ to ‘ought,’ and they are especially likely to recommend 
deregulation,” and citing Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, 
The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002) for an example). 
7 Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State,’ WASH. 
POST. (Feb. 23, 2017), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-
fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-
d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.16c394723ed7. 
8 A newer wave of “capture” scholarship paints a much less bleak picture, acknowledging that capture may 
sometimes exist, but that it is usually something that can be addressed by smart institutional design. See 
Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1 (2010); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies 
Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). 
9 See, e.g., Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, & John W. Patty, Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and 
Representation Across Policy-Making Venue, 33 J. PUB. POL. 33 (2013); Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb 
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68  J. POL. 128 (2006) 
[hereinafter A Bias Towards Business]; Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of 
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sweet Talking]; Scott R. Furlong and Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule 
Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353 (2004). One exception is the study of 
three significant rulemakings conducted by Justice Tino Cuellar, which found extensive citizen participation 
far outpacing business participation in public comment periods.  See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking 
Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005).  
10 See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, A Bias Towards Business, supra note 9; Yackee, Sweet Talking, supra note 9; Simon 
F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of 
Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507 (2015). 
11 Susan Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter and David 
43 HARV. ENT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
 Preliminary Draft—Do Not Cite Without Permission  5 
 
Of course, almost all of the research to date examines participation in the latest stages of the 
regulatory process, when most of the important political disputes over the agency’s agenda and the 
broad substance of agency action have been resolved.12 The focus on these late stages poses serious 
methodological problems that limit what we can learn from empirical study. First, showing influence 
at these later stages most often means showing that business interests are successful in encouraging 
agencies to tinker with the technical minutiae of rulemaking proposals that may well still impose 
substantial costs on the regulated and deliver substantial benefits to the public.13 Consider, for 
instance, National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency promulgates and updates on a set schedule mandated by the Clean Air Act.14 
Evidence that business interests (producers of electricity) succeed in influencing the EPA to relax 
the permissible concentration levels of an air pollutant between a proposed rule and final rule might 
show up in a carefully designed empirical study as evidence of influence, but that fact alone would 
tend to obscure the fact that NAAQS overwhelmingly impose costs on discrete businesses to benefit 
the general public.15 Second, precisely because what typically remain in the latest stages of the 
rulemaking process are technical, detail-oriented questions that require substantial expertise and on-
the-ground knowledge of the regulated activity, it is hardly surprising that business interests have 
                                                
A. Moss, eds., 2014) [hereinafter Reconsidering Agency Capture]; Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory 
Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221 (2012). 
12 Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 68 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 865 (2016); SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, CORPORATE AMERICA AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: HOW 
OFTEN DOES BUSINESS GET ITS WAY? 133 (2006) (arguing that proposed rules reflect most of the important 
decisions that agencies make and are likely to contain indicia of business influence); Richard Murphy, 
Enhancing the Role of Public Interest Organizations in Rulemaking Via Pre-Notice Transparency, 47 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 681, 693 (2012) (noting “the well-known fact of administrative life that most of the real policymaking 
in legislative rulemaking occurs well before an agency publishes an NPRM in the Federal Register”). 
13 Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 
8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998) (finding that most changes attributable to business influence 
in the public comment process were minor, technical changes with no clear impact on the overall stringency 
of the rule); but see Haeder & Yackee, supra note 10, at 513 n.20 (analyzing the substantive significance of 
changes to rule texts during review in the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and finding that business interests were able to influence OIRA to adopt 
substantively significant changes at an even later stage than the public comment period). 
14 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2016) (prescribing the EPA’s duties to promulgate and revise NAAQS for 
criteria air pollutants). 
15 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020 (April 2011), 
available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf 
(estimating the net benefits by 2020 of Clean Air Act regulations, including about 85 percent attributable to 
the NAAQS alone, at $2.0 trillion and the costs at $65 billion). 
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disproportionate influence, as they tend disproportionately to possess this expertise and 
information.16  
 
 For these reasons, there is much more that can be gleaned about the nature and impact of 
business involvement in the regulatory process from examination of the stage of the process where 
business influence is most likely to be truly formative, consequential, and contrary to the public’s 
interest: the agenda-setting stage of the regulatory process.17  Looking for evidence of excessive 
business influence during public comment periods is somewhat like losing one’s keys and looking 
only where the light is good.  Business participation and influence at this stage is easy to observe 
because it is so public, but there is every reason to believe that the potential payoff of business 
participation at the much less visible agenda-setting stage is greater.18 If we are looking for an accurate 
picture of business interests’ ability to sway regulators to act contrary to the public interest, and 
perhaps to effectively control and capture agency decision making, we need to go where the influence 
is likely to be most pronounced, not where the light happens to be. 
 
 In this Article, I aim to do just that by examining in unprecedented depth how business 
interests attempt to shape agency agendas.  Rulemaking petitions, which are specifically provided for 
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),19 allow any person to request that an agency initiate 
rulemaking proceedings to change regulatory law, whether by adding new regulatory programs or by 
amending or rescinding existing ones.20  Rulemaking petitions therefore give business interests the 
                                                
16 Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and 
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2004) (“Often, the best source of information about the 
risks of products, the behavior of individuals and firms, the costs of remediation or mitigation, or the 
feasibility of different technologies will be the very firms that the government regulates.”). 
17 Coglianese & Walters, supra note 12 (highlighting the probable importance and paucity of scholarly 
research on the agenda-setting phase of the regulatory process); Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra 
note 11, at 299 & n.44 (collecting sources making just this point). 
18 Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air 
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 102 (2011) (noting that public participation during public 
comment periods on proposed rules is likely the “tip of the iceberg in providing avenues for interest groups 
to inform agencies’ rulemaking projects”); Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 11, at 309  
(reporting results that “imply that studying the politics of the preproposal stage may be just as important as 
the notice and comment period,” and that “[i]f influence exists—indeed, if agency capture exists—then it may 
be directed toward stopping unwanted proposals early in the policy formation process”). 
19 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2016). 
20 Jason A. Schwartz & Richard L. Revesz, Petitions for Rulemaking: Final Report to the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, ACUS at 21-24 (2014), available at 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%2520Petitions%2520for%252 
0Rulemaking%2520Report%2520%255B11-5-14%255D.pdf. 
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means to further “corrosive capture” via deregulatory petitions,21 as well as to further “anti-
competitive capture” via proposals for new regulatory requirements that disproportionately affect 
competitors or establish a monopoly by creating barriers to firm entry.22  Moreover, because non-
business interests submit petitions as well, almost always to impose additional regulations on 
business,23 it is possible to view the ultimate fate of petitions submitted by these other groups as a 
window into agencies’ propensity to favor business interests by keeping pro-regulatory ideas off the 
agenda.24 In short, rulemaking petitions are a useful lens through which to study business influence 
in all its varieties at the earliest and most important stages of the regulatory process, and close 
examination of how rulemaking petitions affect agency agendas thus promises to advance our 
understanding of business influence on regulation. 
 
 The paper proceeds in four parts. Part I grounds the research in the tradition of empirical 
research examining business participation, influence, and capture.  Part II then provides background 
on rulemaking petitions, highlighting how little is known about the institution.  Part III turns 
attention to an analysis of original data on the complete set of petitions submitted to three federal 
administrative agencies from 2000 through the early part of 2016.  I analyze two key questions using 
quantitative data collected on the lifecycle of each petition: Who petitions (and for what)? and How 
often (and how quickly) does the agency listen and respond?  In Part IV, I discuss what these findings mean 
for our understanding of business influence in the regulatory process. On the whole, the analysis 
suggests that, while they succeed in petitioning more often by some measures, business interests have 
something less than a stranglehold on regulators’ agendas. Moreover, most of the success of business 
interests in petitioning is confined to some of the least troubling kinds of requests—i.e., those from 
diffuse business interests asking for technical changes to existing regulations to provide regulatory 
relief or update outdated provisions. I argue that the evidence supports the idea that agencies engage 
with interest groups with critical distance at the agenda-setting stage, and that the driving force in 
agency decision making is not the identity or interests of the petitioner, but instead the agencies’ 
incrementalist, pragmatic orientation toward improving existing regulatory programs.25 Agencies, at 
                                                
21 Carpenter & Moss, supra note 3, at 16-18 (describing “corrosive capture” as occurring where “organized 
firms render regulation less robust than intended in legislation or than what the public interest would 
recommend”).  
22 Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA 
Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT 153-54 (Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds., 2014) (distinguishing “corrosive capture” 
from a “Stiglerian account of capture” that “predicts that captured regulation will be stronger in the sense of 
imposing more rigid and less permeable entry barriers to the market”).  See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983). 
23 See infra Tbl. 1. 
24 Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency 
Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2011).  
25 See infra Part IV.B. 
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least those covered here, largely ignore petitions, and especially so when they evince a patina of 
attempted anti-competitive capture.    
 
I. WHAT IS KNOWN AND WHAT IS NOT KNOWN ABOUT BUSINESS INFLUENCE IN THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
There is little question that business interests are extensively involved in American 
policymaking.  Whether viewing from 30,000 feet or from within the weeds of a specific institutional 
context, empirical studies are more or less unanimous in finding that business interests are active 
and sophisticated in their participation,26 and that these well-heeled interests often get what they 
want.27 There are probably innumerable venues in which this business activity is operative, including 
in campaign spending,28 in lobbying Congress for legislation,29 and in the generation of influential 
ideas and policy solutions in think tanks,30 but the focus in this paper is on business participation 
in a more limited domain: the regulatory process, and in particular, rulemaking.    
 
Why focus on the regulatory rulemaking? First, rulemaking is how most law is made—the 
number of regulations promulgated each year far exceeds the number of laws produced by 
Congress.31 Second, according to a tradition known as “capture theory,” the regulatory process is 
                                                
26 See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (1986); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO 
LOSES, AND WHY (2009); Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Preferences 
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 51 (2013). 
27 See, e.g., Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 564 (2014); LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2016). But see Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and 
Coincidental Representation, 13 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 1053 (2015) (taking issue with the Gilens & Page study, 
supra); Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Review of the ‘Oligarchy’ Result, 2 RES. & 
POL. (2015) (same); J. Alexander Branham, Stuart N. Soroka, & Christopher Wlezien, When Do the Rich 
Win?, 132 POL. SCI. Q. 43 (2017) (same). 
28 RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016).  
29 LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED 
AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE (2015). 
30 DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE IDEAS INDUSTRY: HOW PESSIMISTS, PARTISANS, AND PLUTOCRATS ARE 
TRANSFORMING THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS, ch.5 (2017). 
31 Croley, supra note 6, at 14 (“[Agencies’] decisions dwarf those of the other three branches, certainly by 
volume and arguably by importance as well.”); see generally CORNELIUS KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, 
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY (2011). 
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virtually hardwired for pathological business domination.32  The argument stems from the logic of 
collective action, which posits that those narrow interests with the most to gain or lose will always 
be more motivated to organize, mobilize, and participate than more diffuse interests with only small 
stakes in any given policy fight.33 While regulatory policymaking certainly imparts substantial diffuse 
aggregate benefits to the public at large,34 it also often imposes substantial concentrated costs of 
compliance on regulated businesses, making them much more acutely interested and motivated to 
take countervailing action in the otherwise obscure field of agency rulemaking.35  With these 
asymmetrical stakes, business interests can generally be expected to invest a great deal of resources 
in seeking to control, or at least influence, regulatory policy relative to other more unorganized and 
inattentive public interests. Whatever one thinks about the second-order question about whether 
business influence in the regulatory process amounts to full-on capture,36 the logic of collective action 
strongly predicts disproportionate participation and influence by business interests.  Regulators, for 
their part, are thought to be dependent on this participation, which makes this participatory skew 
likely to manifest in skewed outcomes as well.37 
 
A. Prior Empirical Research on Business Capture in the Regulatory Process 
 
Many students of the regulatory process have examined just this hypothesis, exploiting the 
fact that publicly visible administrative procedures for rulemaking bring some (but certainly not all) 
regulatory lobbying by business to the surface. This feature of the administrative process, known as 
“notice-and-comment rulemaking,” is established by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),38 and 
it basically entails requirements that agencies issue a detailed proposal of their planned course of 
action, allow for a period (usually a few months) of public submission of comments, and then issue 
                                                
32 Croley, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that under accounts of regulatory capture, “[t]he regulatory system 
advances concentrated interests not accidentally or incidentally, but rather by its very structure and design”). 
Capture theory is oftentimes treated interchangeably with a somewhat broader research tradition known as 
“public choice” theory, which basically applies simplistic rational choice economic modeling to government 
institutions, such as the bureaucracy.  For general background on public choice theory in the law, see DANIEL 
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2010); JERRY L. 
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1999); 
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000). 
33 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
34 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the net benefits of Clean Air Act regulations).  
35 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980). 
36 For an argument that capture is conceptually distinct from, and far less common than, ordinary business 
influence, see Carpenter & Moss, supra note 3. 
37 Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 18, at 102 (“Business groups . . . benefit from the agencies’ need for 
information that only regulated interests can provide.”); Coglianese, Zeckhauser, & Parson, supra note 16. 
38 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2016). 
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a final rule addressing the public feedback.39 Although agencies largely remain free to receive ex parte 
contacts while engaged in rulemaking,40 interested parties have strong incentives to submit written 
comments between the introduction of a proposed rule and issuance of a final rule.41  Likewise, after 
the comment period, agencies must submit the most important rules to the White House Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which reviews the rules under certain Executive Orders 
and, importantly, grants and logs any meetings with any interested party that would like to seek 
changes.42   Because at each of these stages it is possible to view rules before and after observable 
lobbying by business interests, it is possible to test the extent of business influence by documenting 
the presence of business interests in regulatory processes and linking observed changes to requests 
made. 
 
On the whole, these studies have revealed striking evidence of business dominance of these 
procedural opportunities for participation.  For instance, in a first-of-its-kind study, Cary Coglianese 
showed that business interests were both omnipresent and numerically dominant in public 
comment periods in a sample of important environmental rulemakings from 1989 through 1991.43  
Specifically, industry associations commented in 96 percent and individual businesses commented 
in 80 percent of the rules he examined.44  Overall, business interests filed almost 60 percent of the 
comments submitted.45 Several subsequent studies drawing on more diverse samples of agency 
rulemaking confirm that these findings were not anomalous or specific to the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  For instance, Jason and Susan Yackee find that about 57 percent of comments 
                                                
39 See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466 (1991) (discussing the steps 
involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking, also known as “informal rulemaking”). In reality, there are many 
steps before, between, and after these bare-bones steps of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Rachel Augustine 
Potter, Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking, 79 J. POL. 841, 842 (2017). 
40 Sidney A. Shapiro, Two Cheers for HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 853 (2002). 
41 Doing so allows one to preserve an issue for possible pre-enforcement challenge of a rulemaking in federal 
court.  Otherwise, courts will likely consider any claims in judicial review nonexhausted.  See Wagner, Barnes, 
& Peters, supra note 18, at 116-17. 
42 These requirements, which have existed since the Reagan administration but have maintained the same 
basic form since the Clinton administration, require agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis of significant 
proposed rules and revise rules in response to OIRA’s analysis of those cost-benefit analyses before finalizing 
them. See generally Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling 
Effect and ‘OIRA Avoidance’ in the Agencies?, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 443 (2013); Steven Croley, White House Review 
of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821-885 (2003) [hereinafter White House 
Review]; Haeder & Yackee, supra note 11. 
43 CARY COGLIANESE, CHALLENGING THE RULES: LITIGATION AND BARGAINING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 75 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan). 
44 Coglianese, supra note 43. 
45 Coglianese, supra note 43. 
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in their sample of rulemakings from across the executive branch came from business interests.46 
Wendy Wagner and colleagues find that the number is even greater in the context of hazardous air 
pollutant regulation, amounting to 81 percent of the comments submitted.47 Rule review at OIRA 
is similarly dominated by business interests, with such interests logging well over 50 percent of the 
meetings in each of the major studies of participation.48 These patterns have been confirmed again 
and again in a variety of stages of the regulatory process.49 
 
The empirical evidence is much more mixed, however, when it comes to assessing business 
influence, defined as an association between participation and policy changes. Some, but certainly 
not all, studies are able to trace linkages between participation and favorable outcomes, particularly 
in the case of business interests.50 These studies code changes as either increasing or decreasing the 
stringency of proposed rules, and then show that requests for increases or decreases in stringency in 
public comments from business interests are associated with such changes.51 Yet, in many of the 
studies, it is not clear how significant the changes were as a matter of policy. This is both because 
large-n studies do not usually attempt to assess comprehensively the policy issues at play and because 
the change in policy is usually measured relative to a recent iteration of the rulemaking process (for 
instance, the changes from the proposed rule to the final rule). One might not expect much serious 
change in these short windows of time, as too significant a change could run afoul of administrative 
law requirements that final rules be a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule.52 Moreover, agencies 
may sandbag against business influence of this sort by issuing proposed rules that are more stringent 
than they would even prefer.53  Where the sample has been small enough to assess the policy 
significance of changes linked to greater participation, researchers have generally concluded that 
                                                
46 Yackee & Yackee, A Bias Towards Business, supra note 9. 
47 Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 18. 
48 Croley, White House Review, supra note 6; RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA, & JAMES GOODWIN, 
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS TRUMP PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
WORKER SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5, Ctr. for Progressive Ref. (2011); Haeder & Yackee, supra note 
11. 
49 See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 Duke L.J. 943 (2006) 
[hereinafter Citizen Participation]; Boehmke, Gailmard, & Patty, supra note 9. 
50 Compare Yackee & Yackee, A Bias Towards Business, supra note 9, with David C. Nixon, Robert M. Howard, 
& Jeff R. DeWitt, With Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59 (2002). 
51 Yackee & Yackee, A Bias Towards Business supra note 9. 
52 Envtl. Integrity Proj. v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 995-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing the logical outgrowth rule). 
53 Croley, supra note 6. 
43 HARV. ENT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
 Preliminary Draft—Do Not Cite Without Permission  12 
most changes are insignificant.  Often, they are technical in nature, and rarely to do they “alter[] the 
heart of the proposal.”54 
 
B. The Primacy of the Agenda-Setting Stage 
 
In sum, there is extensive evidence that businesses participate at high rates but little evidence 
that any of this participation is truly consequential. But that may simply reflect the fact that the late 
stages of the regulatory process that have been the focus of this literature would not be suspected to 
yield many changes of any kind. In large part because administrative procedures like notice-and-
comment rulemaking and OIRA review put significant pressure on agencies to present polished 
work, agencies have actually pushed almost the entirety of rule development to the pre-proposal 
stage.55 Agencies that do not sufficiently hone and vet their proposal before the issuance of a 
proposed rule cannot conduct the kind of public comment dialogue that courts expect,56 and they 
also risk vacatur for violating the logical outgrowth rule—a court-imposed requirement that final 
rules bear some basic resemblance to the proposed rule circulated for comment.57 Thus, for most 
agencies, the agenda-setting stage of the rulemaking process will likely see the weightiest agency 
decisions being made about the content of the rules.58 And where there are weighty decisions being 
made, the logic of collective action tells us that the groups with the most at stake are not likely to be 
too far behind.59 Consequently, empirical studies of business interest influence in the regulatory 
process that ignore agenda-setting are likely to miss much of the action. Indeed, political scientists 
interested in political power have long cautioned against ignoring the “second face of power”—the 
decision not to take on a particular agenda item from among the universe of possible agenda items—
precisely because these kinds of decisions open opportunities for disproportionate influence on 
policymaking.60 
 
                                                
54 Golden, supra note 9, at 259 (finding that only one rule in her sample saw notable substantive changes 
between proposal and finalization; William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and 
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 66, 73 (2004) 
[hereinafter Institutional Policy Analysis] (finding a majority of rules in his sample did not change substantially 
between proposal and finalization). 
55 West, Institutional Policy Analysis, supra note 54, at 68; Murphy, supra note 12. 
56 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249-53 (2d. Cir. 1977). 
57 William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 
41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 580 (2009) [hereinafter Black Box]; Murphy, supra note 12, at 685. 
58 Coglianese & Walters, supra note 12. 
59 Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 18, at 111 (arguing that “[i]ndustry enjoys a particularly privileged 
position in the development of rules”); West, Black Box, supra note 57, at 589. 
60 Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947 (1962); Peter Bachrach 
& Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 632 (1963);  
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To be sure, research on business influence has not entirely ignored the agenda-setting and 
pre-proposal stages of the regulatory process.  Taking advantage of the fact that agencies sometimes 
issue so-called advanced notices of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) and accept open-ended 
comments when they are considering a particular agenda item, Susan Yackee and colleagues have 
shown that businesses are not only frequently involved in reinforcing agencies’ inclination to act, 
but also exercise influence by engaging in agenda-blocking.61 Similarly, Wendy Wagner, Katherine 
Barnes, and Lisa Peters show that regulated business submitted “at least 170 times more informal 
communications . . . during the pre-NPRM stage than public interest groups” in a sample of EPA’s 
hazardous air pollutant rulemakings.62 However, because in both these studies regulated entities 
knew proposed rules were coming because of the ANPRM or because a statutory deadline required 
the rulemaking, these studies do not explain how interest groups may have influenced the agency to 
act in the first place.  
 
Going one step further, William West and Connor Raso probe the earliest stages of agenda-
setting by sampling finalized agency rules and then tracing them to their origins.63  West and Raso 
find that about half of these rules emerged from the informal interaction of government officials 
and business interests within the context of existing programs, and that they were most often 
demonstrably   nonconsequential efforts to update or correct rules based on feedback and experience 
in implementation.64 The remaining rules were nondiscretionary—i.e., compelled by statute or court 
order, and thus only loosely the product of lobbying.65 A more recent study by Wendy Wagner and 
colleagues likewise uncovers a rich tapestry of “incrementalist” adaptations of existing rules 
encouraged by business interests and other groups.66 These studies suggest that the bulk of business 
influence at the agenda-setting stage is collaborative, and the workaday rule amendments that result 
are presumably not far from the public interest in keeping regulatory programs working.67  
 
Of course, even these latter two studies examine only one side of the equation.  In each 
instance, the sample is drawn from instances of successful lobbying; unsuccessful attempts by 
business interests to shape the agenda were not observed. More informative would be study of 
discrete instances where agencies are presented with a choice to add an item to their agenda and 
                                                
61 Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency 
Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373 (2011); Keith Naughton et al., Understanding Commenter 
Influence During Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 258 (2009). 
62 Wagner, Barnes, & Peters, supra note 18, at 125. 
63 William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic 
Responsivness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 495 (2012). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Wendy Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017). 
67 Coglianese & Walters, supra note 12. 
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make decisions that either do or do not benefit business interests. In the next part I explain why 
rulemaking petitions capture these scenarios and why examining them can advance the study of 
business influence. 
 
II. RULEMAKING PETITIONS: NUTS AND BOLTS 
 
The right to petition the government is older than the Constitution itself, and it has always 
offered its users the promise of political influence.68  One way petitions offer the promise of 
influence is through the meta-politics of petitioning. In the antebellum Republic, for instance, 
women anti-slavery activists used petitions to Congress to build powerful political coalitions that 
would later support the women’s suffrage movement.69 Even though such petitioning has rarely led 
to any concrete action from the target of the petition, the opportunity to network has touched off 
social movements, party building, and state building.70 But petitions can also be efficacious in a more 
narrow, legal sense. As some constitutional scholars have noted, petitions invoke a regularized 
process and afford some semblance of due process to the petitioner, effectively making them a 
protector of minoritarian rights.71 When that process is ignored, petitioners have more recourse than 
they otherwise would have to force an institutional response. 
 
It is this latter kind of “legal” influence that most applies to petitioning in the regulatory 
process.72 The APA provides that any “interested person” can file a petition with an agency and 
                                                
68 Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1142 (2016) [hereinafter Lobbying 
and the Petition Clause] (characterizing 2015 as the “eighth hundredth anniversary of the right to petition” 
because its roots go back at least to Magna Charta); Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 7 (tracing the First 
Amendment right to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances” to “frustration over the repeated 
denial of the colonists’ petitions sent to their government in England”); Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to be 
Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 192-95 (2002). 
69 Daniel Carpenter & Colin D. Moore, When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning and the Political 
Mobilization of American Women, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 479 (2014). 
70 See generally Clayton Nall, Benjamin Schneer, & Daniel Carpenter, Paths of Recruitment: Rational Social 
Prospecting in Petition Canvassing, AM. J. POL. SCI. (2017); Daniel Carpenter, Recruitment by Petition: American 
Antislavery, French Protestantism, English Suppression, 14 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 700 (2016); Daniel Carpenter 
& Benjamin Schneer, Party Formation through Petitions: The Whigs and the Bank War of 1832-1834, 29 STUDS. 
IN AM. POL. DEVELOPMENT 213 (2015); Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 
127 YALE L.J. __ (2018, forthcoming). 
71 McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, supra note 68, at 1184-85 (discussing how the historical petition 
right, as enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, had “more in common with the right 
to procedural due process than it [did] with free speech,” and how the “petition right preserved only the 
procedures of acceptance, consideration, and response for each petition without respect to the political power 
of the petitioner”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1155 (1991). 
72 To be sure, the recent trend toward “mass commenting” campaigns in notice-and-comment rulemaking 
closely resembles the kind of meta-political petitioning campaigns that Carpenter and others have 
documented in earlier eras. For instance, in its rulemaking proceeding to rescind net neutrality regulations, 
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request “issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”73 Petitions may mirror the informal, ex parte 
contacts that generate so much of the incrementalist activity documented above —indeed, the APA’s 
definition of a petition may technically extend to such oral contacts74—but once a petition is defined 
as such, it triggers obligations on the part of the agency to respond.75  The APA spells out the duty 
in unequivocal terms: “Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of a written 
application, petition, or other request of an interested person made in connection with any agency 
proceeding.  Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory, the notice shall 
be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial.”76 Section 555(e) of the APA prevents 
agencies from simply sitting on petitions without making a decision by providing that “within a 
reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.”77 Agency rules 
often also spell out additional procedures for the processing of petitions, including tight deadlines 
for responses and requirements that certain information be included with the petition.78  
 
The principal advantage of filing a petition rather than informally lobbying an agency is just this 
procedural formality. Because of this formality, petitioners have a legal recourse when their petition 
is ignored. When an agency fails to respond sufficiently quickly or thoroughly, the petitioner may 
                                                
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) received over 20 million comments, most urging the agency 
to keep the regulations.  See Brian Naylor, As FCC Prepares Net-Neutrality Vote, Study Finds Millions of Fake 
Comments, NPR (Dec. 14, 2017), available at https://www.npr.org/2017/12/14/570262688/as-fcc-prepares-
net-neutrality-vote-study-finds-millions-of-fake-comments. Under the standard administrative law 
understanding, the vast majority of these mass comments required no response from the FCC, and they are 
decidedly not treated as “petitions.” See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343 (2010) (discussing the mass comment phenomenon, outlining the consensus view, 
and offering a slightly heterodox take on the importance of agency responses to mass comments). I am aware 
of no study that examines whether participation in mass comment campaigns leads to a similar kind of 
political mobilization as occurred with petitions to Congress in early American history, but it is an interesting 
question worthy of research. 
73 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2016). 
74 Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 24-25.  
75 Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 11-13.  There are many lingering unanswered questions about what 
constitutes a petition. Id. at 24-25.   As mentioned above, courts have not treated public comments as petitions 
for the purposes of enforcing procedural norms in notice-and-comment rulemaking, but in some instances 
agencies read comments as petitions, siphoning off a request for changes to the scope of a rulemaking and 
promising to deal with it separately.  
76 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2016). 
77 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2016). 
78 Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 31-32 (reviewing agency-imposed procedures governing appropriate 
petitioners, what constitutes a “grant,” deadlines for agency responses, tiers or stages of review, and decision 
criteria). 
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sue to force a response.79 For instance, in a recent decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had to respond to a petition 
submitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council requesting a ban of the pesticide chlorpyrifos, 
which has been linked to brain damage in children.80  According to the court, the EPA’s nearly nine-
year delay in deciding on the petition was “egregious and warrant[ed] mandamus relief.”81  Moreover, 
if there is denial of the petition, what would otherwise have been a “simple nondecision[],” which 
courts generally lack jurisdiction to review, becomes a “decision[] not to decide,” which is 
presumptively reviewable.82  Lingering legal uncertainties about whether denials of petitions for 
rulemaking are final agency actions were definitively resolved in Massachusetts v. EPA.83 There, EPA’s 
rejection of a rulemaking petition requesting that the agency take action to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions from automobile sources eventually resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court ordering EPA to 
either ground its petition denial in factors recognized by the statute or grant the petition—and EPA 
chose the latter on remand. Although the Court emphasized that the level of deference given to 
petition denials may be greater than it is under ordinary arbitrary and capricious review,84 the 
                                                
79 The APA gives courts the power to review agency actions unreasonably delayed.  See Telecomms. Res. & 
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”) (applying a multi-factor test for determining 
whether there was an unreasonable delay of legally required agency action).  In effect, courts treat this TRAC 
factor analysis under the APA as synonymous with the writ of mandamus, see Independence Mining Co., Inc. v. 
Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Although the exact interplay between [mandamus and APA 
relief] has not been thoroughly examined by the courts, the Supreme Court has construed a claim seeking 
mandamus under the MVA, ‘in essence,’ as one for relief under § 706 of the APA.” (quoting Japan Whaling 
Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 US. 221, 230 n.4 (1986))).  To be sure, this is generally a difficult hurdle 
for plaintiffs to jump: courts have always treated mandamus as a “drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved 
for really extraordinary cases.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) 
(citing Ex Parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-260 (1947)) (internal quotations omitted). 
80 In re Pesticide Action Network North America v. EPA, 798 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2015). 
81 Id. 
82 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of Not Now: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 
157, 159 n.2 (2014); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 653, 672 (1985) (noting that inaction is less reviewable when it involves mere delay, rather than a 
“decision not to act”). 
83 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 527 (2007) (holding that “[r]efusals to promulgate rules are … susceptible 
to judicial review” because, “in contrast to nonenforcement decisions,” which are presumed unreviewable 
under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), “agency refusals to initiate rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more 
apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public 
explanation.’” (quoting American Horse Protection Ass’n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  For a discussion of how 
rulemaking petitions render different kinds of traditionally unreviewable agency actions reviewable, see 
generally Sean Croston, The Petition is Mightier Than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over 
“Regulation Through Guidance,” 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381 (2011). 
84 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007). 
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decision speaks for itself in terms of the power of judicial review to force agencies to respond to 
petitions with a meaningful, tailored response. In sum, courts stand at the ready to review agency 
decisions regarding rulemaking petitions, which means rulemaking petitions can be a powerful tool 
to influence agenda-setting. 
 
Although it is easy enough to point to major rulemakings that began with petitions,85 such as 
the EPA’s regulations of carbon emissions, we know practically nothing about how rulemaking 
petitions work in practice.  Indeed, “[t]here is scant empirical evidence on the number of petitions 
received and how they are ultimately disposed,”86 and “[l]ittle is known about stakeholder and agency 
practices with respect to submitting and addressing petitions.”87 That has begun to change, however, 
with a number of studies suggesting that petitions are quite often an effective means of influencing 
agency agendas. Michael Livermore and Richard Revesz first brought valuable attention to the 
potential functions of petitions in their work on Clean Air Act petitions submitted to EPA.88 Wendy 
Wagner and colleagues, in their study of rule revisions, showed the more general reach of petitions, 
identifying informal interest group pressure and rulemaking petitions as the second and third most 
frequent sources of rule revisions ahead of court orders, congressional action, and presidential 
requests.89 Most of the lobbying and petitions came from “regulated industries” with the greatest 
“incentives to keep agency rules operating properly.”90 Eric Biber and Berry Brosi study the 
                                                
85 A common view among administrative law scholars, fed by readily available examples of petition-initiated 
regulatory proposals, is that petitions can be a vehicle for public interest groups to check agency inaction and 
prevent capture. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2012); Croley, supra note 6, at 259-60 (discussing a rulemaking petition to 
regulate tobacco that “showed agency responsiveness to public interest advocates acting through the 
administrative process rules to affect . . . agencies’ agendas”). The quantitative look that I provide in Part III, 
infra, will allow some evaluation of this widespread triumphalist assumption about how petitions work in 
practice. 
86 CORNELIUS KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW 
AND MAKE POLICY 78-79 (2011). 
87 Steven J. Balla & Susan E. Dudley, Stakeholder Participation in Regulatory Policymaking in the United States, 
OECD (Oct. 2014). While one Senate report found that petitions “submitted by representatives of those 
outside a regulatory industry approximated or exceeded petitions submitted by regulated industries,” see 
Croley, supra note 6, at 260 n.2 (citing Study of Federal Regulation, vol. 3: Public Participation in Regulatory 
Agency Proceedings 14-15), there has been little detailed work on patterns of petitioning. 
88 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 85.  
89 Wagner et al., supra note 18, at 218 fg. 7. 
90 Wagner et al., supra note 66, at 226. If this focus on technical adaptation is a common feature of petitions, 
Reeve Bull’s suggestion that rulemaking petitions could serve as a useful structuring device for retrospective 
rulemaking (i.e., reviewing existing rules and making adjustments or rescinding outdated regulations) makes 
a good deal of sense. See Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking 
Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. (2015). 
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somewhat specialized petitions process for Endangered Species Act listing decisions, finding that 
citizen petitions relay critical information to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as it makes decisions 
affecting wildlife.91 David Nixon provides the most in-depth look at petitioning to date in his 
examination of rulemaking petitions filed at the Federal Communications Commission, where 
about half of all rulemakings originate with a granted rulemaking petition.92  Relevant to discussions 
of business influence and capture, Nixon found that “[i]nstitutionalized players clearly enjoy 
advantages in getting the Commission to accept their proposals for policy change.”93 However, 
Nixon’s research does not trace the fate of granted petitions after the agency’s decision, nor it does 
it attempt to evaluate the policy significance or the general content of the petitions that were granted.   
 
These studies show a growing appreciation of the importance of rulemaking petitions in 
agency agenda-setting, but important questions remain about whether petitions facilitate excessive 
or inappropriate business interest influence.  
 
III. PETITIONS AND BUSINESS INTERESTS: A QUANTITATIVE LOOK 
 
In this Part, I analyze an original dataset comprising the lifecycle of rulemaking petitions 
submitted to three different agencies: the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the 
Food Safety & Inspection Service (FSIS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the U.S. Department of Transportation.  I 
selected the agencies because they are high-volume rulemaking agencies, because data on rulemaking 
petitions94 received by the agencies are available or reasonably accessible for a period of time 
encompassing multiple presidencies and configurations of power in Congress,95 and because they 
are representative of the diversity of relevant characteristics across the regulatory state.96  On this last 
point, the agencies vary on whether they are independent agencies or executive agencies, and they 
                                                
91 Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information 
in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321 (2010).  
92 David C. Nixon, Setting the Agenda for Federal Agencies: Rulemaking Petitions at the FCC, 23 JUSTICE SYS. J. 1 
(2017). 
93 Nixon, supra note 92, at 251. 
94 My focus is entirely on general rulemaking petitions. Agencies routinely accept other kinds of petitions, 
such as petitions for waivers from generally applicable regulations, but much as rulemaking is the most 
important way that agencies set policy, rulemaking petitions are the most important kind of petitions. See 
Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20. 
95 Although regulations.gov is, in theory, a central electronic docketing system for all agency activities, including 
petitions received, it is in practice usually incomplete.  An exception is NHTSA, which posted almost all 
petitions it received on regulations.gov (the remainder were discovered through systemic searches of the Federal 
Register).  For CPSC and FSIS, the bulk of the submitted petitions were docketed on agency websites, although 
some missing information required a trip to FSIS’s physical docket room in Washington, D.C.  
96 DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (2012). 
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also differ in their ideological leaning, at least by the estimation of Clinton-Lewis scores.97 The 
dataset covers all petitions submitted to these three agencies between 2000 and most of 2016—a total 
of 290 petitions. While full records from start to decision were available for 175 of these petitions, 
115 of the petitions were right censored (i.e., did not receive a response from the agency during the 
period of observation, and we cannot be sure whether this is because the study ended before a 
response could issue or because the petition was constructively denied by nonresponse). We can 
observe essential characteristics of these petitions, as well as the fact of nonresponse, but in many 
cases we cannot know what the agency thought of the petition because it never weighed in.   
 
These technical considerations aside, there are three frames through which to analyze 
petitioning and the relative influence of business interests: these are 1) the characteristics of petitions 
and the timing of submission; 2) the outcomes of petitioning; and 3) the timing of outcomes. The 
data allow analysis within each of these frames. First, by reading each petition or the description of 
the petition offered by the agency, it was possible to content code petitions on a number of 
dimensions, including what type of party submitted the petition, whether they sought a pro-
regulatory or de-regulatory change, whether the change sought was substantive or technical, and 
whether the petition asked for an entirely new regulation or sought to amend an existing regulation. 
I made these content-based coding determinations myself, and I validated this coding by giving a 
research assistant a random sample of petitions to code and computing inter-coder reliability 
statistics.98 Second, data on dispositions at several stages of the petitioning process were collected, 
including whether the agency ever responded at all to the petition, whether it granted the petition, 
and whether it finalized a rule stemming from the grant.99  Finally, the data note the dates associated 
with each major stage of petition processing,100 which makes it possible to examine the ways the 
                                                
97 See Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 
POL. ANALYSIS 3 (2007). On these scores, which rely on expert evaluation of agency ideological leanings to 
generate a scaled ideology estimate, the CPSC scored -1.69 (very liberal), FSIS scored .07 (moderately 
conservative), and NHTSA scored .16 (more conservative). 
98 Each of the variables fell well within the range of acceptable agreement for inter-coder reliability, with 
results ranging from “moderate agreement” (de-regulatory petition had an agreement rate of 82.5 percent and 
Cohen’s kappa score of .548) to “almost perfect agreement” (petitioner type had an agreement rate of 87.5 
percent and a Cohen’s kappa score of .835).  See Anthony J. Viera & Joanne M. Garrett, Understanding 
Interobserver Agreement: The Kappa Statistic, 37 FAMILY MEDICINE 360, 362 (2005). 
99 For FSIS, the agency’s final response was usually included on the website where petitions were collected.  
For CPSC and NHTSA, I usually had to do structured searches of the Federal Register to log final responses.  
I searched for a petition number (if applicable), party names, and key petition terms for any Federal Register 
log of activity related to each petition identified.  This painstaking process was aided by the fact that NHTSA 
and CPSC were relatively consistent in how they formatted responses to petitions.  Of course, there remains 
some chance that these searches missed some responses, but most should be accounted for.  The difficulty of 
tracking down these records underscores the need for more systematic docketing activities for petitions.  See 
Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20. 
100 Two petitions did not have a date of submission, making these observations drop from the analysis 
involving agency response times. 
43 HARV. ENT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
 Preliminary Draft—Do Not Cite Without Permission  20 
agencies manage their petition dockets over time and to assess any disparities in the processing time 
for petitions. 
 
A. Characteristics and Trends of Business Participation 
 
The content coding of petitions yielded important information about the aggregate patterns 
of petitioning—what kinds of groups participated, to what degree they participated, and what they 
asked for when they participated. Of course, for the purposes of this Article, the most relevant 
information concerns business interests’ patterns of involvement. Fully 170 of the 290 petitions in 
the data (58.62 percent) were filed by business interests, a category comprising both single business 
corporations, such as the Ford Motor Company or Tyson Foods, and industry associations, such as 
the American Trucking Association or American Association of Meat Processors. However, although 
business interests numerically dominate the petition process, the data reveal that business interests 
are far from monolithic, with diffuse business interests (industry associations) pursuing notably 
different strategies than discrete business interests (single businesses). 
 
1. Static Characteristics 
 
As a first cut, Table 1 breaks out the count of petitions by the basic petitioner types and the 
petition type.  Business interests (combining both industry associations and single businesses) are far 
more likely to seek deregulatory changes, technical changes, and derivative changes to existing text 
than are non-business interests.  The profile is clear: the modal petition submitted by a business 
interest is a narrow request to amend existing regulations by eliminating or softening certain 
requirements.  For example, in April 2007, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)—an 
industry association representing BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, 
Toyota, and Volkswagen at the time—petitioned NHTSA to amend a list of approved Child Restraint 
Systems (CRS).101 AAM aimed to fix a specific problem that had emerged because NHTSA had not 
kept up to date the list of approved CRS systems for safety testing, as it had promised when its 
advanced airbag rule had initially been promulgated.  The list was populated with CRS systems that 
were no longer even in production, making it “impossible for vehicle manufacturers to acquire the 
CRSs that are needed to conduct certification tests to assure compliance with the requirements of 
the standard.”102 AAM’s proposed solution called for NHTSA to “allow manufacturers the option 
of certifying vehicles to any edition of [the list] for five model years after the edition first becomes 
effective,” in effect giving manufacturers more flexibility to comply using a variety of standards.103  
 
                                                
101 Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Petition for Rulemaking to Amend FMVSS No. 208 with Respect 
to Testing with Child Restraint Systems, at 1 (Apr. 27, 2007), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2007-27027-0012. 
102 Id. at 4. 
103 Id. at 6. 
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As Table 1 shows, it is somewhat atypical for business interests to seek pro-regulatory, 
substantive, and original proposals, but such petitions do exist.  Consider the National Chicken 
Council’s petition to FSIS requesting that the agency “adopt regulations establishing labeling 
requirements for not-ready-to-eat (NRTE) stuffed chicken breast products that may appear ready-to-
eat (RTE).”104 As the National Chicken Council explained, it was “becoming increasingly aware that 
some consumers may not know how to properly recognize and prepare NRTE stuffed chicken breast 
products that may appear RTE.”105 Perhaps as a means of protecting itself from liability or 
preemptively protecting the industry’s reputation against bad apples, the Council saw more 
regulation of labeling as needed and sought to have that codified as a new section in the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
 
TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF PETITIONS BY PETITIONER TYPE 
  Deregulatory Regulatory Technical Substantive Derivative Original 
Individual 12 (29.27) 29 (70.73) 8 (19.51) 33 (80.49) 25 (60.98) 16 (39.02) 
Public Interest 5 (6.41) 73 (93.59) 5 (6.41) 73 (93.59) 30 (38.46) 48 (61.54) 
Single Business 55 (56.12) 43 (43.88) 50 (51.02) 48 (48.98) 80 (81.63) 18 (18.37) 
Industry Ass'n 42 (58.33) 30 (41.67) 33 (45.83) 39 (54.17) 61 (84.72) 11 (15.28) 
       
Non-Business 18 (15.00) 102 (85.00) 13 (10.83) 107 (89.17) 56 (46.67) 64 (53.33) 
Business Interest 97 (57.06) 73 (42.94) 83 (48.82) 87 (51.18) 141 (82.94) 29 (17.06) 
       
Total 114 (39.45) 175 (60.55) 96 (33.22) 193 (66.78) 196 (67.82) 93 (32.18) 
 
 While business interests writ large do appear to share some general inclinations toward 
deregulatory and derivative petitions, there are important differences between single businesses 
(which are more discrete interests with potentially more to gain through a strategy of anti-competitive 
capture) and industry associations (which are more diffuse interests representing a host of businesses 
in competition with one another). Compared with single businesses, industry associations are 
marginally more likely to seek substantive changes and deregulatory changes, and more likely as well 
to target existing rules for amendment rather than proposing new programs. Table 2 focuses on just 
the category of single businesses, showing notable differences in strategy depending on firm 
characteristics.  Large firms, defined by inclusion on either the Fortune 500 or the Global Fortune 
500,106 or both, were significantly more likely to seek pro-regulatory changes and technical changes, 
and marginally more likely to propose original programs. Consider, for example, a petition 
                                                
104 National Chicken Council, Petition to Establish Regulations for the Labeling and Validated Cooking 
Instructions for Not-Ready-to-Eat Stuffed Chicken Breast Products That Appear Ready-to-Eat, at 1 (May 24, 
2016), available at https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/e63c4755-2965-4872-b834-
fcd798f58488/16-03-National-Chicken-Council.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
105 Id. at 4. 
106 Coding was based on the lists published in 2017.  See FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/ 
(last accessed Jan. 19, 2018); GLOBAL FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/global500/ (last accessed Jan. 19, 
2018). 
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submitted by General Motors NA—number eight on the Fortune 500 and number 18 on the Global 
Fortune 500—requesting that NHTSA “require the installation of daytime running lamps (DRLs) 
on passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have a gross vehicle weight 
rating under 4,536 kilograms.”107 Somewhat similarly, petitions submitted by repeat players, defined 
as petitioners who submitted at least one other petition during the period of study, were more likely 
to be pro-regulatory and technical, but were also more likely to be derivative in the sense of toying 
with existing rule text.   
 
TABLE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE BUSINESS PETITIONS BY BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS 
  Deregulatory Regulatory Technical Substantive Derivative Original 
Fortune 12 (48.00) 13 (52.00) 15 (60.00) 10 (40.00) 20 (80.00) 5 (20.00) 
Small Bus. 43 (59.72) 29 (40.28) 35 (48.61) 37 (51.39) 59 (81.94) 13 (18.06) 
       
RepeatPlay 37 (52.11) 34 (47.89) 41 (57.75) 30 (42.25) 61 (85.92) 10 (14.08) 
OneShot 59 (60.20) 39 (39.80) 41 (41.84) 57 (58.16) 79 (80.61) 19 (19.39) 
       
Total 55 (56.70) 42 (43.30) 50 (51.55) 47 (48.45) 79 (81.44) 18 (18.56) 
 
Together, these patterns may suggest that the biggest business players may use petitions to 
impose regulatory barriers to entry, whereas the smaller business players tend to seek regulatory 
relief. At the very least, the findings demonstrate that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to business 
participation in rulemaking petitions.  Business interests seek a wide variety of regulatory actions. 
 
2. Submission Patterns 
 
The data also allow some treatment of the patterns of petitioning over time, given that the 
sample comprises petitions submitted over a 16-year period encompassing three presidential 
administrations.  As Figure 1 demonstrates, one of the most striking overall trends is a generally 
steady decline in petitioning activity over this time period.  Since this time period mostly corresponds 
to the shift from a Republican President (George W. Bush) to a Democratic President (Barack 
Obama), one possible explanation is that petitioners see more opportunity in a Republican 
administration than in a Democratic administration.  This opportunity might look different 
depending on what the petitioning group wants—public interest groups may see petitions as a way to 
set up litigation to force agency action, and business groups may see either an administration 
receptive to requests for regulatory relief or an administration that may not have as many qualms 
with facilitating anti-competitive capture by powerful economic interests.  But the trend is 
unmistakable. And it stands to reason: if Democratic administrations are, on balance, more 
proactive with respect to regulation, there would be less potential agenda space to be filled by 
petitioning, and therefore less potential payoff for using the device. 
 
 
                                                
107 General Motors NA, Daytime Running Lamps, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2001), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2001-8876-0011. 
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF PETITIONS SUBMITTED BY YEAR, 2000-2016 
 
 
Figure 1 also reveals some notable trends with regard to petition characteristics.  Most 
apparent are the sizeable differences in the trends of business interest participation versus non-
business interest participation, on the one hand, and of original versus derivative petitions on the 
other.  In both instances, a disproportionate amount of the general surge of petitions during the 
George W. Bush Administration comes from business interests and is derivative (i.e., seeks changes 
to existing text rather than proposing wholly new programs).  The trends for the opposites of these 
categories (i.e., non-business interest petitions and original petitions) are relatively static over the 
entire 16-year period.  Compare this to de-regulatory and pro-regulatory petitions, which were filed 
at about the same rate over time, although that base rate itself changed.  
 
B. Distribution of Outcomes  
 
The second frame through which to view petitioning activity concerns outcomes. Although 
there may be some symbolic petitioning,108 on the whole it is fair to assume that when a party submits 
a petition, a major goal is to have the agency grant that petition and begin a rulemaking responsive 
to the request. In the aggregate, only 60.34 percent (n=175) of petitions in the data received a 
response during the course of the study, and of these, only 63 were granted.  This translates to a 36 
                                                
108 Again, historical work on petitions in Congress suggests that coalition building and political mobilization 
was a major purpose of petitioning, see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text, and there is no reason to 
think that this purpose has faded away in the context of rulemaking petitions. Interest groups frequently 
publicize petitions.  
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percent chance of a grant, conditional on actually receiving a response (and merely a 21.72 percent 
chance of a grant ex ante).  Clearly, petitioning most often does not achieve even the most basic goals 
of the petitioner. 
 
When it comes to competition across petitioner type for these few grants, however, the 
evidence suggests the playing field is not entirely level.  Figure 2 displays the results of two separate 
logistic regressions of the basic determinants of agencies’ decisions to respond to and grant 
petitions.109 The results suggest two basic—and somewhat contradictory—biases in the decisions 
agencies make about petitions. First, in terms of responding to petitions (and, for the moment, 
ignoring the substance of the disposition), agencies favor relatively discrete interests, such as 
individuals and single businesses.  In terms of marginal probabilities, individual petitioners have 
well over a 70 percent chance of hearing back from the agency when they petition, whereas public 
interest groups have less than a 50 percent chance. Single businesses also fare better on average than 
industry associations, although that difference is not statistically significant.  Second, the bias shifts 
toward relatively diffuse interests when it comes to the ultimate decision to grant a petition. Whereas 
individuals were the most successful parties in terms of garnering an agency response to their 
petitions, they have far less success with grants, with only a 20 percent chance of a grant compared 
to a 52 percent chance of a grant for industry associations. Industry associations’ 52.4 percent chance 
of a grant is higher than single businesses’ 33.8 percent chance (the difference is statistically 
significant at the p=.017 level).  And while public interest groups had an estimated 34.3 percent 
chance of a grant, the 95 percent confidence interval extends as high as 59.1 percent.  On the whole, 
the most diffuse interests (both business-oriented and public-oriented) have the upper hand in terms 
of actually receiving a grant, even as more discrete interests are more likely to have their “day in 
court.”110   
 
As discussed in Part III.A, business interests are hardly monolithic in terms of the substantive 
changes they seek by petitioning, and as Figure 3 demonstrates, there are measurable differences in 
the kinds of business requests that are likely to sway agencies.  The results are from six logistic 
regressions: one for single businesses, one for industry associations, and one for public interest 
 
                                                
109 I also estimated these models as a Heckman selection model, see Francis Vella, Estimating Models with Sample 
Selection Bias: A Survey, 33 J. HUM. RES. 127 (1998), but the results were substantively similar and diagnostics 
suggested there was no need to specify a selection model (i.e., the factors that determine responsiveness per 
se are substantively different from the factors that determine grants). This means there is no real risk that 
agency tendencies in the response stage are statistically biasing the estimates of the factors that determine 
grants. 
110 It is worth pausing to note the importance of the fact that agencies generally do individual petitioners the 
courtesy of officially responding even when they decline to act on a petitioner’s request. That is, the data 
suggest agencies take “the right to be taken seriously” seriously. Weinberg, supra note 68.   Social psychological 
research suggests that, when it comes to the factors that shape citizens’ perceptions of government, showing 
that the government is listening is more important than giving citizens the outcomes they desire. See, e.g., E. 
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). The agencies in 
this study deserve some credit for their special responsiveness to the least powerful players in the process. 
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FIGURE 2: EFFECTS OF PETITIONER TYPE ON PETITION RESPONSES AND GRANTS 
 
Notes: Labels represent the point estimates of logistic regressions with response and grant conditional on 
response as dependent variables.  Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals. In each regression, 
robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level.  For the logistic regression of responses, the total 
observations were 288 and the pseudo R2 was .0556.  For the logistic regression of grants conditional on 
response, the total observations were 175 and the pseudo R2 was .1012. Petitions submitted by individuals 
serve as the reference group, or baseline, for Petitioner Type. 
 
 
groups, all for the two critical decisions to respond to and grant petitions.111 For responses, the 
important factors are whether the petition seeks a deregulatory and/or a substantive change.  On 
the whole, pro-regulatory petitions and technical petitions are more likely to generate responses.  
Interestingly, whether the petitioner is a repeat player is not a significant factor.  For grants 
(conditional on receiving a response at all), technical petitions are similarly favored.  However, there 
are two important shifts in emphasis at this threshold.  First, familiarity with the petitioner becomes 
an extremely important factor, at least for single businesses.  A petition submitted by a single business 
that filed at least one other petition improved the chances of a grant from 27.1 percent to 44.4 
percent. Second, whereas pro-regulatory petitions submitted by single businesses fared far better in 
terms of garnering a response of some kind, once a deregulatory petition receives a response, it is 
actually far more likely to be granted than a pro-regulatory petition.  The probability of a grant jumps 
from 25.5 percent to 41.5 percent, holding all else constant.   
 
                                                
111 Again, running these models as a Heckman selection model made no substantive difference. See supra note 
109 and accompanying text. 
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What can these results say about business influence and capture via petitions?  On the level 
of influence, business interests clearly hold an advantage, with business interests on the whole having 
a 40.9 percent chance of a petition grant compared with a 27.7 percent chance for non-business 
 
FIGURE 3: EFFECT OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PETITIONER TYPE AND PETITION CHARACTERISTICS 
ON PETITION RESPONSES AND GRANTS 
 
Notes: Labels represent the point estimates of logistic regressions with response and grant conditional on 
response as dependent variables.  Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals. In each regression, 
robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level.  For the response models, the observations and model 
fit were as follows for each group: single businesses (n=97, pseudo R2=.0801); industry association (n=72, 
pseudo R2=.0544); and public interest group (n=78, pseudo R2=.0427). For the grant conditional on response 
models, the observations and model fit were as follows for each group: single businesses (n=68, pseudo 
R2=.1332); industry association (n=42, pseudo R2=.0223); and public interest group (n=35, pseudo R2=.1607). 
 
 
interests (statistically significant at the p=.028 level). Without a plausible measure of the public 
interest, however, it is difficult to say that petitions facilitate capture.  Moreover, if petitions were 
facilitating the most pernicious form of capture—the use of regulation to impose restrictions that 
disproportionately burden business competitors and erect barriers to entry112—not only would we 
expect to see single businesses fare better than more diffuse business interests such as industry 
                                                
112 Carpenter, supra note 22, at 153-54 (noting that the sine qua non of the “Stiglerian account” of capture is 
that it “predicts that captured regulation will be stronger in the sense of imposing more rigid and less permeable 
entry barriers to the market,” in effect allowing the industry to use “regulation to form a cartel and restrict 
supply and/or entry”).   
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associations, but we would also expect to see pro-regulatory petitions from single businesses being 
granted more frequently than deregulatory petitions.  Neither is the case.   
 
However, the results are at least theoretically consistent with an account of corrosive capture 
where individual businesses succeed in relieving themselves from regulatory requirements that 
broadly apply.113  One of the strongest patterns in the data is the success of deregulatory petitions, 
provided that these petitions can survive some disproportionate skepticism in the selection decision 
to respond in the first place.  Agencies seem to be most inclined to use petitions from business 
interests to identify opportunities to trim existing regulations and dole out regulatory relief, 
particularly when doing so involves a technical fix that the regulated clientele has identified.114  This 
last caveat may suggest, however, that the data are more consistent with healthy regulatory 
incrementalism than with highly consequential regulatory rollbacks.115 
 
C. Timing of Responses and Grants 
 
While receiving up-or-down determinations on petitions may be the ultimate goal for 
petitioners, half of the battle is against the clock. Agencies sometimes act within days of receiving a 
petition, but often they sit on petitions for extraordinarily long periods of time.116 For the petitions 
in my data that received a response, the longest observed delay before an official response was 3,805 
days, or almost 10.5 years.117 To be sure, agencies’ median response time was considerably more 
                                                
113 Id. at 154-55 (discussing the mechanisms of “corrosive capture,” which aims to “push the regulatory process 
in a ‘weaker’ direction, not with the aim of reducing entry, but with the aim of reducing costly rules and 
enforcement actions that reduce firm profits”). 
114 Wagner et al., supra note 66, at 244-45 (“Our study reveals that some revision techniques are rigorous and 
transparent, but that others lack transparency and fail to provide opportunities for all relevant interests to 
weigh in on technical issues and policy changes.  As such, they may facilitate the kinds of subterreanean 
decisionmaking long associated with agency capture.”) 
115 Id. at 227-41 (discussing the policy benefits of rulemaking incrementalism); Neil R. Eisner & Judith S. 
Kaleta, Federal Agency Reviews of Existing Regulations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 140-43 (1996) (same); Robert L. 
Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulations Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1179 (2004) (same). For a more general discussion, see infra Part IV.C. 
116 In theory, a long delay might entitle a petitioner to sue for an order to respond to the petition.  See Schwartz 
& Revesz, supra note 20, at 13-17. However, Schwartz and Revesz report that there is, all told, very little 
“unreasonable delay” litigation over pending petitions.  Id. at 67 (noting that “[s]tatistics bear out that 
litigation over petitions is not very common,” and that “[s]ome stakeholders will threaten litigation to force 
an agency response after a long delay, but often the agency simply takes that opportunity to deny the petition, 
and the lawsuit is dropped”). 
117 Of course, some petitions in the data never received a response during the period of observation, and if 
they are considered with the rest, then the maximum consideration time was essentially the entire duration 
of the study: 6,197 days, or 16.98 years.   
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palatable, with fully 50 percent of petitions receiving their response within 573 days and 25 percent 
within 264 days.   
 
With such drastic ranges of consideration time, it is clear that there is a possibility of 
disparate treatment across groups and types of requests. We can use survival analysis to examine the 
factors that determine how swiftly agencies process petitions. I estimated response times using a Cox 
proportional hazard regression, which allows comparison across groups while holding characteristics 
of petitions constant.   Figure 4 shows the resulting survival curves—an estimatation of the probability 
of receiving a particular response at any given time—for both the fact of the agency’s official response 
(left panel) and the response if the response was a grant (right panel), both broken out by petitioner 
type.  These curves show statistically significant disparities in the pace of processing petitions 
submitted by different kinds of interests.  Starting with the left panel, we see that, relative to the 
baseline group (individual petitions), petitions from single businesses (p=.000), industry associations 
(p=.011), and public interest groups (p=.022) are processed faster.  Of the four petitioner types, single 
businesses are the fastest, with a hazard ratio of 1.68, or about a 68 percent greater chance of 
receiving a response at any given time than an individual petition.  Compared to more diffuse 
interests (i.e., industry associations and public interest groups), single businesses are 37 percent and 
24 percent more likely to receive a response at any given time.  Of the characteristic covariates, only 
deregulatory petitions are significantly different in terms of response time: with a hazard ratio of 
1.20 (p=.012), such petitions are about 20 percent more likely to receive a response at any given time 
than pro-regulatory petitions, holding all else constant. 
 
FIGURE 4: TIMING OF RESPONSES AND GRANTS BY PETITIONER TYPE 
 
Notes: The plots represent survival estimates derived from a Cox proportional hazards regression.  
The estimated survival curves control for the following covariates: deregulatory, substantive, original, 
repeat player. 
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However, when the analysis changes to the processing of grants (right panel) and not just 
responses, the advantage of single businesses falls away and the most significant advantage goes to 
public interest groups.  Public interest groups have a hazard ratio of 2.13 (p=.000), meaning they are 
fully 113 percent more likely to receive a grant at any given time than individual petitioners.  They 
are, moreover, 68 percent more likely to receive a grant at any given time than industry associations, 
and 108 percent more likely than single businesses to receive a grant.  
 
Much as Figure 3 broke out the interactions between petitioner type and petition 
characteristics, Table 3 below reports the effect on timing of agency responses for the different kinds 
of requests petitioners make.  The results are reported as hazard ratios, or the likelihood of receiving 
a determination at any particular time, where estimates above 1.0 indicate faster processing and 
estimates below 1.0 indicate slower processing.  The results in Table 3 show that the most important 
factors in speeding up a response vary across petitioner type. Single businesses are 203 percent more 
likely to receive a response and 324 percent more likely to receive their grant at any given time if 
they are a Fortune 500 or Global Fortune 500 honoree than if they are not.  Similarly, industry 
associations are 144 percent more likely to receive a response and 492 percent more likely to receive 
their grant if they are a repeat player in the data than if they are not. By contrast, the most important 
determinant of public interest group success is when they petition for deregulatory changes: indeed, 
they are 545 percent more likely to receive a response at any given time and 280 percent more likely 
to receive their grant at any given time if they are breaking from their usual pattern and suggesting 
regulations should be weakened in some way. 
 
TABLE 3: COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD REGRESSIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE TIMING OF 
PETITION RESPONSES AND GRANTS 
 Respond Grant (If Responded) 
 Single Bus. Industry Ass'n Pub. Int. Single Bus. Industry Ass'n Pub. Int. 
Deregulatory .992 .838 5.45*** .575 1.24 2.80*** 
Substantive 1.85 .902 .655 3.85* .929 .622 
Original 1.08 1.14 1.86* 2.12 .276 2.06* 
Repeat Player .581** 1.44* .999 .733 4.92* 1.05 
Fortune 500 2.03***   3.24**   
N 66 42 34 22 22 11 
Wald X2 11.79 .05 52.71 .19 11.82 .24 
Prob > X2 .0027 .9744 0.000 .6612 .0027 .4300 
 
In sum, survival analysis shows significant disparities among petitions in terms of response 
time and grant time.  One of the strongest findings is that public interest groups get to the finish 
line (i.e., a grant) much more quickly than other groups.  While single businesses got some kind of 
news from the agency much faster, the agencies were at the same time much slower to grant petitions 
from single businesses than from diffuse groups.  Still, some evidence does fit the “capture” story. 
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Looking more closely at business interests, there is some evidence that large businesses do better 
than small businesses, and that being a repeat player often helps in the process.  
 
D. After the Grant 
 
The ultimate measure of success is convincing the agency to not only begin a rulemaking, 
but also to finish it.  By this test, rulemaking petitions are far from a sure bet.  Of the 290 petitions 
in the data, only 40 (13.8 percent) resulted in a final rule during the period of study.118  But while 
success is, overall, rare, the first column of Figure 5, which presents the results of logistic regressions 
with the dependent variable set as adoption of a petition as a final rule, makes clear that there are 
certain ex ante predictors of success. These models, unlike the ones before, control for a number of 
covariates that are expected to affect agencies’ ability to finalize rules.119 Relative to individual 
petitioners, only public interest groups are more likely to see their petition materialize as a final rule.  
Likewise, deregulatory petitions are more likely to succeed, and substantive petitions are less likely 
to succeed. It would be difficult to square these probabilities with a story of capture or even of 
excessive business influence, although by the same token the kind of petition that succeeds hardly 
fits the triumphalist narrative of petitions as a means of spurring major regulation.  The most 
successful petitions tend to be technical and deregulatory, even if they are submitted by public 
interest groups. 
 
Then there is the question of petitions that made it through the gauntlet and garnered a 
grant. Grants of petitions only mean that the agency will initiate rulemaking.  Many proposed rules—
even those that don’t have their origin in a rulemaking petition—are withdrawn before they are 
finalized.120  And, in the context of petitions, there might be situations where the agency insincerely 
grants petitions it does not intend to finalize, whether to appease the filer or to satisfy the terms of 
a court order.121 Is there any evidence that the agencies used this mechanism to award disparate 
                                                
118 This is somewhat surprising, given that courts do review delays in finalizing rules initiated via petition, and 
may in fact “treat the cessation of a rulemaking with more scrutiny than a straight denial of a petition.” 
Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 26.  
119 These additional covariates are # Final Rules (count of the number of actions in the Unified Agenda at the 
final rule stage at the time of the agency’s decision on the petition); # Proposed Rules (count of the number of 
actions in the Unified Agenda at the proposed rule stage at the time of the agency’s decision on the petition); 
# Pre-Rules (count of the number of actions in the Unified Agenda at the pre-proposal stage at the time of the 
agency’s decision on the petition); Dem. President (dummy variable for whether the President was from the 
Democratic Party); Divided Government (dummy variable for whether either chamber of Congress and the 
President differed in party identification); and Consideration Time (the number of days from the petition filing 
to the agency’s decision to grant the petition). 
120 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative 
State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 959-63 (2008) (presenting data on rulemaking withdrawals captured by the Unified 
Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions). 
121 Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20 (discussing the phenomenon of pro forma denials in response to court 
orders to respond). 
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FIGURE 5: DETERMINANTS OF ADOPTION OF REGULATORY PROPOSALS IN FINAL RULES 
 
Notes: Labels represent the point estimates of logistic regressions with response and grant conditional on 
response as dependent variables.  Whiskers represent 95 percent confidence intervals. In each regression, 
robust standard errors are clustered at the agency level.  For the “All Petitions” model, the total observations 
were 171 and the pseudo R2 was .2476.  For the “Granted Petitions” model, the total observations were 62 
and the pseudo R2 was .6147. Petitions submitted by individuals serve as the reference group, or baseline, for 
Petitioner Type. 
 
benefits to different types of group? Figure 5 again provides some of the answers to these questions. 
The results of the logistic regression suggest that no one type of petitioner does particularly well 
relative to the baseline category of individuals.  In fact, the only petition characteristic correlated 
with finalization is substantive ambition. Overall, there is little evidence that grants are insincere for 
any particular group. 
 
These results must be taken with a grain of salt, however.  Some of the failures to finalize 
might simply be the result of the rulemaking process failing to run its course. Rulemaking can take 
many years, and many of the observed grants happened within the last few years of the available 
data.  These results are therefore just a preliminary look at how agencies treat granted petitions after 
the formal response.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Rulemaking petitions present a relatively unique opportunity to examine business influence 
in action. In the world of rulemaking, the opportunity to observe discrete agency choices about 
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agenda-setting is extremely rare.122 Rulemaking petitions are an exception to the general rule that 
both interest participation and agency responses to participation at the agenda-setting phase of the 
rulemaking process are invisible. Often, the only trace of this process that emerges is the decision to 
initiate a rulemaking proceeding by announcing a notice of proposed rulemaking or, in some 
instances, an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.123 The participation and lobbying that did 
not result in changes or any kind of agency response might as well have never occurred.  
 
But with rulemaking petitions, it is possible to trace systematically the requests for regulatory 
change straight through both decisions and non-decisions, revealing the full spectrum of influence. 
And not only do rulemaking petitions come at the very earliest possible stages of the rulemaking 
process, when opportunities for influence are the greatest and the most likely to yield significant 
fruit,124 but they also allow a relatively “pure” observation of influence. Almost by definition, an 
agency needs to be influenced if a petition is submitted. Petitioners would have little reason to submit 
the petition if the agency was already fully on board with the request.125 Would-be petitioners could 
spare themselves the trouble if the only purpose was to ensure that agencies were aware of an issue—
there are open telephone lines for that kind of communication.126 Formalizing a petition suggests 
that the petitioner believed that the agency needed nudging. Thus, any positive agency action in 
response to petitions suggests that agencies were in fact influenced—to move out of a state of inertia, 
at the very least.  
 
 Studying rulemaking petitions thus presents the possibility of overcoming some of the 
difficulties that have dogged empirical assessment of claims of excessive business influence and 
capture in the rulemaking process. Empirically examining who petitions, for what purposes, and 
with what kind of success is a path to a better overall understanding of business influence, both 
attempted and achieved. What emerges in this study is the strong probability that business influence 
on regulatory agenda-setting, and by implication, on regulatory policy, is quite limited. 
 
A. Capture? 
 
In evaluating the evidence, I draw on Susan Yackee’s three-prong test for identifying capture 
empirically.  First, if capture exists, we would “expect that a subpopulation of individuals or 
organizations—be it business interests or some other subpopulation—will stand out as the top 
                                                
122 Coglianese & Walters, supra note 12; West & Raso, supra note 63. 
123 See supra notes 61 and accompanying text. 
124 West, Black Box, supra note 57. 
125 It is not unimaginable, however, that agencies might encourage parties to petition for certain changes that 
both the petitioner and the agency are on board with if the agency believes that it needs political and legal 
cover for its action.   
126 See supra notes 40 and accompanying text. 
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lobbying participant.”127 Second, we would “expect that a subpopulation will stand out as 
consistently influential.”128 Finally, but only if the first two prongs are satisfied, we would “expect to 
see agency decision making gravitate toward the policy preferences of the subpopulation, even when 
technical information, data, or evidence points decision making in a different direction.”129  
 
On the first prong, the data do reveal business interests as the dominant petitioners, at least 
when one considers single business corporations and industry associations as part of a larger category 
of business interests. As reported, business interests accounted for 58.62 percent of the observed 
petitions.  But content coding the substance of the petitions, even to the limited extent possible 
here, suggests that there is significant heterogeneity even within the business community as to the 
overall goals of petitioning—and that may complicate the story.  While business interests as a whole 
seek more deregulatory and “derivative” petitions (in effect, amendments to existing rules to soften 
their requirements) than do public interest groups or individuals, single business corporations more 
often seek out pro-regulatory changes that impose new requirements on an industry. This is 
particularly the case with the biggest corporations, i.e., Fortune 500 or Global Fortune 500 players, 
which were significantly more likely to seek pro-regulatory changes than smaller businesses. By 
contrast, industry associations are more focused on deregulatory, technical changes, perhaps 
reflecting their more diffuse interests as representatives of an entire industry.  
 
If business interests are split to account for this heterogeneity, then it is clear that there is no 
clearly dominant interest. Single businesses account for the highest percentage (33.91) of the sample, 
but public interest groups are not far behind at 26.99 percent.  Industry associations account for 
only 24.91 percent of the sample.  It also bears mentioning that individual petitioners (14.19 
percent130) most often advanced requests similar to the ones submitted by public interest groups.  
Consider, for instance, a petition submitted by Justine May, whose recreational vehicle’s tires kept 
blowing out because the collective weight of appliances and attachments exceeded the maximum 
                                                
127 Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture, supra note 11, at 300-01. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 This figure indicates that individuals meaningfully participate in the petitions process at a much higher 
rate than they do in later stages of the rulemaking process. See Coglianese, Citizen Participation, supra note 49, 
958 (discussing studies finding minimal individual participation and concluding that “neither agencies’ 
acceptance of comments by e-mail nor the development of the Regulations.gov portal have led to any dramatic 
changes in the general level or quality of public participation in the rulemaking process,” and that “[m]ost 
rules still garner relatively few overall comments and even fewer comments from individual citizens”). 
Although Justice Tino Cuellar finds that the vast majority of public comments in three important rulemakings 
came from individuals, Cuellar, supra note 9, at 462 tbl. 4, he does not distinguish “between comments from 
individual members of the public who chose to send in comments with little prodding from organized 
interests . . . and those whose comment was generated as a result of interest group organizing, id. at 434. In 
contrast with these mass commenting campaigns, the individual petitions here are truly individual 
contributions to the regulatory process, and they are not a negligible fraction of the total petitioning activity. 
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load.131 When she complained to the manufacturer, it “said they have no regulations they are 
required to follow” as far as reporting the maximum carrying capacity.132 Her petition sought to 
change that (and the agency followed through on her request).133 Most other individual petitions are 
similarly oriented toward consumer issues, and take on a similar posture toward business regulation.  
Considered together, public interest groups and individual petitions accounted for a plurality of the 
petitions observed.  The predominance of business interests thus depends in part on how one defines 
business interests. 
 
Proceeding to the second prong, the evidence stands in tension with a conclusion that 
business interests achieve consistently higher influence than any other group.  Together, business 
interests had a greater chance of having any given petition granted, and the difference was statistically 
significant. Additionally, there are indications that status as a repeat player or a multi-national 
corporation helps business interests garner a grant or capture the limited attention of the regulator. 
But when we disaggregate business interests, public interest groups do at least as well as, if not better 
than, either single corporations or industry associations.  Certainly, no one group does consistently 
better than all the other groups. Moreover, the frame through which we evaluate outcomes matters 
a great deal.  For instance, individual petitioners do better than most other groups when it comes to 
garnering a formal response from the agency.    
 
The lack of consistently disproportionate influence is striking because of how easy it would 
be to give business interests whatever they want. Rulemaking petitions, because of their low visibility 
and low risk of oversight, are prime territory for “subsystem politics.” In contrast with notice-and-
comment rulemaking, where the agency publicly notifies interested parties of the opportunity to 
respond to proposals, the difficulty of monitoring petitioning activity insulates the agency from 
exposure to countervailing perspectives and competing interests. While there are occasionally letters 
submitted supporting or opposing a petition,134 usually all the agency has to go on is the information 
provided by the petitioning party, and all it has to worry about, from a strategic perspective, is 
disappointing that party and perhaps engendering litigation.  This is the kind of area where 
expectations of business influence are high, if traditional models of public choice are to be believed.  
But agencies are decidedly reluctant to act on petitions, both with respect to business interests in 
particular and as a general matter.    
 
                                                
131 Justine May, Petition to the Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Jan. 14, 2000), available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2000-7073-0002. 
132 Id. 
133 Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Cargo Carrying 
Capacity 72 Fed. Reg. 68,441 (Dec. 4, 2007). 
134 And in some cases, the agency will open a public comment period on the petition, although it is not 
required to by the APA. Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20. 
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Given these results, it is not even necessary to proceed to Yackee’s third prong—i.e., effective 
control over agencies against the agency’s preferences.135  The data strongly suggest that agencies 
keep their distance from the petitioning parties, casting serious doubt on the validity of the public 
choice account of agency capture. 
 
B. Incrementalism and Autonomy 
 
As just discussed, the identity of the party does not seem to drive agency decision making 
with regard to rulemaking petitions.  What does apparently drive agency decision making, however, 
is a certain type of interaction with petitioners of all kinds.  Specifically, agencies favor rulemaking 
petitions that request narrow, technical changes in a deregulatory direction.  In terms of marginal 
probabilities, requesting a deregulatory change raises the probability of a grant (conditional on 
response) 16.92 percent (statistically significant at the p=.007 level) and requesting a substantive 
change decreases the probability of a grant (conditional on response) 20 percent (statistically 
significant at the p=.000 level), holding all else, including petitioner type, constant.  These patterns 
suggest that business interests find petitions useful as a device to bring agencies’ attention to 
outdated provisions in existing regulatory programs, and that agencies likewise find these suggestions 
useful as a way of structuring their ongoing monitoring of regulatory programs.136 When combined 
with the overall low rates of petition grants, the picture that emerges is one of an adaptive and 
incrementalist dialogue between regulated entities and agencies,137 with agencies retaining a great 
deal of autonomy and directorship of the deliberations.  
 
That agencies apparently use rulemaking petitions in this way is not terribly surprising. 
When agencies engage in rulemaking, they are not, and cannot be, “synoptic.”138  They are bound 
to make mistakes, and one of the critical functions of stakeholder engagement is to identify these 
mistakes and generate ideas for how to fix them.139  Often, the most targeted (and least costly) way 
                                                
135 As discussed above, one advantageous aspect of studying petitions is that they represent instances where 
the agency probably does not itself prefer to act.  Thus, in some ways, the evidence of influence doubles as 
evidence of (a lack of) control.  The fact that business interests do not influence the agency at a higher rate 
than any other group means that business interests do not control the agency. 
136 This is entirely consistent with prescriptive calls to use rulemaking petitions to structure retrospective 
review of regulatory programs. See Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and 
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265 (2015).  For a general discussion of retrospective review (aka 
regulatory “look back”), see Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579 (2014). 
137 Wagner et al., supra note 66; Eisner & Kaleta, supra note 115; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 115. 
138 MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988). 
139 Wagner et al., supra note 66, at 187-88 (noting that “mistakes are inevitable” in the rulemaking process 
and that “a regulatory agency’s wellbeing depends on its regulations remaining current with changing public 
attitudes and the political preferences of those in a position to influence its actions”); Biber & Brosi, supra 
note 91 (finding that citizen petitions provided essential information to agency officials about the need for 
Endangered Species Act listing); West & Raso, supra note 63. 
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to fix mistakes is to revise problematic rule text, rather than tossing out the rule in its entirety or 
issuing informal enforcement guidance that ameliorates the problem.140 By some accounts, this kind 
of incrementalist dialogue with interest groups, including regulated entities, is a sign that the 
regulatory process is working as it should to adapt pragmatically to changed circumstances.141 So 
long as the “deregulatory drift” and predominance of business interests does not reach certain 
thresholds142—and it does not appear to have in the rulemaking petitions analyzed in this study—then 
all is well. 
 
The flip side of this tendency, however laudable it is, is that petitions generally fail to move 
agencies in the opposite direction—i.e., toward major transformative regulatory action.  Although a 
number of commentators have advanced what might be described as a “triumphalist” narrative about 
the pro-regulatory, action-forcing impacts of petitions143—a narrative fed by such successes as the 
petition to EPA to regulate CO2 emissions, and many others—the data here suggest that this kind of 
impact is exceedingly rare.  For public interest group and individual petitioners, the probability of 
the agency granting a pro-regulatory, substantively ambitious petition was 15.78 percent, well below 
the average for all petitions in the sample.  
 
The takeaway is that agencies are, by and large, unmoved by rulemaking petitions, and when 
they do act in response to petitions, it is in a decidedly pragmatic, moderate, and incrementalist 
mode.  This, in turn, has implications for how we think about business influence in the regulatory 
process.  Even in this forum, where the deck is seemingly stacked in favor of rent-seeking behavior,144 
subsystem politics, and agency capture, agencies appear to remain basically autonomous fair dealers, 
motivated by techno-bureaucratic commitments above all else. While this might mean that petitions 
may fail to contribute much to the democratic bona fides of the regulatory process,145 the findings 
also ought to throw some cold water on the hegemony of the public choice account of agency 
decision making.      
 
 
                                                
140 Wagner et al., supra note 66, at 197-98 (describing the pitfalls of wholesale rescission, replacement, and 
informal interpretation as against revising the text through the rulemaking process). 
141 Id. at 242-43 (praising the “virtues” of incrementalist “dynamic rulemaking”). 
142 Id. at 241. See also Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 20, at 26 (noting that “Congress and the courts have 
expressed some concerns with an overly permissive right to petition for amendments and repeals [of rules], 
which may interfere with specific statutory schemes to manage legal challenges to recently enacted rules, and 
which may force agencies to continually revisit and re-litigate long-established rules”). 
143 Croley, supra note 6; Livermore & Revesz, supra note 85. 
144 Teresa M. Schwartz, Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 32, 76 (1983) (arguing that petitions are a vector for special interest influence). 
145 See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State ‘Safe for Democracy’: A Theoretical and Practical 
Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2013). 
